ABSTRACT During the lifecycle of a software system, software patches are committed to software repositories to fix discovered bugs or append new features. Unfortunately, the patches may bring new bugs or vulnerabilities, which could break the stability and security of the software system. A study shows that more than 15% of software patches are erroneous due to poor testing. In this paper, we present a novel approach for automatically determining whether a patch brings new vulnerabilities. Our approach combines symbolic execution with data flow analysis and static analysis, which allows a quick check of patch-related codes. We focus on typical memory-related vulnerabilities, including buffer overflows, memory leaks, uninitialized data, and dangling pointers. We have implemented our approach as a tool called KPSec, which we used to test a set of real-world software patches. Our experimental results show that our approach can effectively identify typical memory-related vulnerabilities introduced by the patches and improve the security of the updated software.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a competitive software market, modern software has short interval times between releases. For example, a new version of the browsers Google Chrome and Firefox is released every 6 weeks [1] . Software bugs commonly exist in the whole software lifecycle due to poor software testing. Even worse, the patches used to fix bugs are often buggy themselves. Recent studies show that almost 9% of all patches are bad [2] . Another study on large commercial operating systems found that 14.8%∼24.4% of patches are incorrect and 22% of those bugs are memory-related vulnerabilities [3] .
It is challenging to determine whether a patch is vulnerable. Traditional regression testing techniques [4] , [5] are normally inefficient, since a complete regression test for a large program consumes much time. In addition, during testing it is impossible to exercise all execution paths. Another popular technique is to statically analyze source code or binary code [6] , [7] . Based on different policies, static analysis can discover multiple classes of bugs. However, without runtime information and program inputs, static analysis normally has a high false negative rate, and cannot find some runtime bugs, e.g., a buffer overflow in a recursive function that is triggered by a particular input.
Compared to regression testing and static analysis, symbolic execution [8] - [11] has an obvious advantage for testing software comprehensively. A symbolic execution tool assumes symbolic values as inputs rather than obtaining actual inputs. For each conditional branch, the symbolic execution tool generates a new constraint and explores a new program path. Along each path, the tool checks whether the input will trigger bugs.
Although symbolic execution has been proven to be good at real-world software testing, it suffers from the well-known path explosion problem. The number of feasible paths in a program grows exponentially with an increase of program size, and can even be infinite with unbounded loop iterations. To avoid whole-program symbolic execution and mitigate the path explosion problem for a software patch that needs to be checked, some researchers check only the patch-related part of the program [12] - [14] . A test case is used for the code changed by the patch. However, it is too hard to generate multiple effective test cases automatically.
In this paper, we present a tool called KPSec, which efficiently detects whether a patch introduces new vulnerabilities. First, our approach combines a control flow graph (CFG) with the pruning method to get rid of the parts of the program not affected by the patch. For the remainder of the program, we find the functions that may cause memory vulnerabilities and mark those functions as security points. Second, possible execution paths are generated through the security points. For each execution path, we use symbolic execution to track all security points along the path, and then look for different types of memory vulnerabilities with multiple security checks. Finally, after all execution paths have been executed and checked, we report the security issues, including the type, location, and execution path of any vulnerability.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Unlike other works, in KPSec we can determine whether a patch would introduce memory-related vulnerabilities without requiring the developer to generate test cases.
• We adopt the pruning method to deal with the wellknown path exploration problem. Thus, the developers can check a patch and get the results reported efficiently.
• For each function affected by a patch that may cause memory vulnerabilities, we use backward and forward trace analysis to search all related paths, combining the symbolic execution engine with security checkers to find different types of vulnerability. This paper is organized as follows. We give a brief overview of the approach in Section II and present the implementation details in Section III. An evaluation is presented in Section IV. Related works are discussed in Section V. The conclusion and future work are presented in Section VI.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE SOLUTION
In general, when a patch has been committed to a software repository, it needs to be tested to ensure that the required functionalities are correctly implemented without introducing any vulnerability. Unfortunately, developers do not normally provide a test case that can execute each path related to a patch.
Unlike the conventional approach for software patch testing, our goal is to automatically test code that is related to a patch without relying on test cases. Figure 1 shows the workflow of KPSec. KPSec takes the program source code and a patch as input. It checks the patch automatically, and finally presents an analysis of the patch. Patch checking consists of three main stages: preprocessing, execution path generation, and symbolic execution with security checkers.
In the preprocessing stage, we preprocess both the source code and the patch. For the patch, since code lines in the same basic block always run together, we choose one line of code to represent each basic block. For the source code, we apply the patch to generate a patched program, and static analysis is used to search its basic blocks. The output of the preprocessing stage is a set of basic blocks in the patched program that are affected by the patch.
The execution path generation stage finds securitysensitive functions and variables in the set of basic blocks. The main execution paths that go through those functions and variables are constructed.
The last stage is symbolic execution with security checkers. In this stage, we use the symbolic execution engine to run through each execution path symbolically. When a securitysensitive function or variable is executed, its security constraints are generated. If a security checker confirms that the security constraints are not satisfied, a security vulnerability is believed to have been found. The checker records the details of the vulnerability, including the type, location, and execution path.
We have also designed an infrastructure for KPSec to execute all three stages automatically, without a requirement to modify the patch or the source code of the program.
III. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
In this section, we describe the implementation details of KPSec based on an example, as shown in Figure 2 . In this example, a patch is committed to fix the buffer overflow vulnerability by increasing the static buffer size. However, the buffer size is still not big enough. If the length of szMsg is greater than 30 bytes, szBuf will overflow. We show the key steps for how KPSec generates the main patch-related execution paths.
A. PREPROCESSING
Preprocessing has two main tasks. The first preprocesses the patch to get rid of irrelevant lines, keeping one line to represent each basic block. The second preprocesses the program source code to get the basic blocks that are affected by the patch.
We first preprocess the patch to get the lines that affect the program's behavior. It is not necessary to record nonexecutable lines, e.g., blank lines, macro definitions, and comments. As a result, we get a set of lines that are executable and represent different basic blocks.
We next obtain a new version of the program source code by applying the patch, then we use the LLVM toolchain to compile the new version into LLVM bitcode, together with the LLVM debug information, which maps LLVM bitcode back to source code. After that, a CFG for the patched program is constructed. Each node in the graph represents a basic block and a directed edge is used to represent a jump or branch in the control flow. With the set of lines obtained in the patch preprocessing stage and the LLVM debug information, we can determine whether a basic block is affected by the patch.
The preprocessing stage is how we mitigate the path explosion problem in KPSec. We explore only paths in the patchrelated basic blocks. After preprocessing, we get the CFG for the patched program and the basic blocks related to the patch.
B. EXECUTION PATH GENERATION
In this stage, the goal is to generate execution paths based on the basic blocks. The procedure is described as follows.
Step 1: For each basic block, we find security-sensitive functions and variables. A security-sensitive function is one that includes sensitive data. For example, the strcpy and memcpy functions are securitysensitive functions since they may lead to a buffer overflow. A security-sensitive variable is one that operates on memory directly or indirectly. For example, if a buffer pointer allocated by the malloc function is not handled correctly, it may cause a memory leak.
Step 2: For each function and variable, we perform both forward and backward analysis to construct a data flow graph (DFG).
Step 3: The main execution paths including securitysensitive functions and variables are generated automatically by traversing the DFG.
The details of execution path generation are as follows.
1) DEFINITION OF SECURITY POINT
A feature of a security point is that its arguments contain untrusted data from files, user input, or network sockets, such as the strcpy function in the patch shown in Figure 2 . We classify security points according to the type of security functions or variables. Memory Management: Memory management functions include memory allocation functions and memory-free functions. We take memory allocation functions, e.g., malloc and alloc, as examples. In general, the arguments of these functions are the destination buffer in memory-copy functions. We trace the memory allocation functions to get the size of the allocated buffer and then mark the buffer. When a function or program is terminated, those marked buffers are checked to see whether they have been freed. Similarly, we also monitor the memory-free functions.
Memory Copy: Memory-copy functions, e.g., strcpy, strcat, and memcpy, fill or connect a destination buffer with a source buffer. If the destination buffer is not large enough to hold the data from the source buffer, a buffer overflow happens. This type of function is the most common target for a buffer overflow attack.
Memory Read: A pointer with an offset is used to access a buffer. If the pointer is not handled carefully, it will cause an out-of-bounds access or uninitialized read (which occurs when the code accesses a buffer without initialization). Note that the memset function needs to be handled specifically, since it is often used to initialize a buffer pointer.
2) CONSTRUCTION OF DATA FLOW GRAPH
With the CFG, basic blocks, and security points, we use data flow analysis to construct a DFG, and generate possible execution paths related to the patch. Beginning with a security point, we use both forward and backward analysis to construct two data flow trees: a forward data flow tree and a backward data flow tree. These two data flow trees are combined to construct the DFG. Therefore, these two trees have the same root node, which represents the security point. Finally, the possible main execution paths are automatically generated by traversing through the DFG.
The process we use to construct the data flow tree is accordance with data flow analysis. Based on the basic blocks and starting from the security point, we use forward analysis to trace the arguments until the origin of the sensitive data is reached. We use backward analysis to get the set of variables that are related to the security point, and then we trace those variables in other blocks. There are several types of node in a data flow tree:
Root Node: The root node of a data flow tree is a security point obtained during the preprocessing stage.
Child Node: In a forward data flow tree, a child node represents an expression from which we get the source of the parent node. In a backward data flow tree, the parent node is the source of the child node. If an expression is assigned to a variable, we use this expression as the source of the variable. For example, for the int int len = strlen(szMsg) statement, the expression strlen(szMsg) is the source of the variable len.
Leaf Node: In a forward data flow tree, the leaf node represents the first variable assignment, while in a backward data flow tree, it is the end of the execution path. The const expression that initializes a variable at the time of declaration is the origin, e.g., int x = 0. In addition, we treat the code statements that initialize the variable with data from files, command lines, or user input as the origin too, e.g., scanf(%d, &x) and char * msg = argv [1] .
A forward data tree is constructed as follows. First, we initialize a stack of <security-point, parent> called stack-init. Each security-point in stack-init is determined using static analysis. parent represents the parent of the security point, and it is assigned to NULL at first, which means the current security point is the root. We also initialize an empty set called set-processed, which is used to store the arguments that have already been processed. Then, we pick up one security point from stack-init, which is the root node of a new data flow tree. Beginning with the root, we find its source code statement according to the relationship between the parent node and the child node. If the source code statement is in the set-processed, we ignore this code statement. Otherwise, we put this code statement into the data flow tree as a child node and push it into stack-processed. For each child node, we repeat the same process until the leaf node is reached. Algorithm 1 shows the details of the process. //construct a new data flow tree 11: root = make_tree(eachitem) 12: end if 13: for source in find_source(eachitem) do 14: if not_orign(source) then 15: stack_init.push(source,eachitem) 16: end if 17: eachitem.child = source 18: set − processed.push(eachitem) 19: end for 20: end while 21: return root;
A backward data tree is constructed by a similar method. The only difference between a forward data flow tree and a backward data flow tree is that the relationship between the parent node and a child node is reversed. In a forward data flow tree, the child node is the source of the parent node, while in a backward data flow tree, the parent node is the source of the child node. The data flow tree is not too large for exploring paths, since we consider only the paths that include security points. Finally, we combine the two data flow trees to generate the DFG and generate possible execution paths by simply traversing the DFG. For the patch shown in Figure 2 , we generate one main-path-related execution path.
C. SYMBOLIC EXECUTION WITH SECURITY CHECKERS
Our symbolic execution engine is based on KLEE [15] . We modified KLEE to perform partialy symbolic execution and implement five security checkers to detect existing memoryrelated vulnerabilities.
In general, a memory security vulnerability is usually caused by the unsafe usage of functions or improperly handling function arguments, especially pointers. To get pointer information for the security checkers, we implement a data structure to store the details of the pointers in a symbolic execution path. The data structure is like the symbol table that is used to record pointer information in SecTAC [16] . We expand the data structure to record more pointer information 20780 VOLUME 5, 2017 to handle more types of memory vulnerabilities. The data structure is described in Listing 1. Listing 1. The pointer_info structure.
Normally, pointer_info structure has six members. uID field is the unique resource identifier, and pointers have the same uID if they point to the same variable. uType field represents the type of the pointer, e.g., int, char, or a userdefined type. It also indicates the position where the pointer is allocated, e.g., in a stack or a heap. We do not consider the memory leak problem related to stack variables, since its memory is automatically recovered by the system at the end of its lifecycle. The uStart field stores the starting position in the array, and uBuflen field stores the length of the pointer. The bInit field is a flag indicating whether the buffer has already been initialized. The bHasfreed field is a flag that indicates whether the pointer has already been freed. For each pointer of a security function in an execution path, we allocate a pointer_info structure and fill the values of the structure members during the procedure of symbolic execution.
Based on the pointer information, we design five checkers to detect five types of memory vulnerabilities, including buffer overflows, out-of-bounds accesses, memory leaks, dangling pointers, and uninitialized data reads. In the rest of this section, we describe each checker in detail.
1) BUFFER OVERFLOW AND OUT-OF-BOUNDS ACCESS CHECKERS
A buffer overflow occurs when a program tries to store more data in a buffer than its size. The attacker will overwrite the values of the instruction pointer (IP), base pointer (BP), and other registers to cause exceptions, segmentation faults, or other errors. In real code, buffer overflows may be caused by using C memory functions, such as memcpy, strcpy, or sprintf, which are security points that we trace in the last stage to generate execution paths.
When the symbolic execution engine encounters an unsafe C memory function, the memory buffer overflow checker gets the detailed information about its arguments, which are always pointers, and stores it into a pointer_info structure. Then, it determines whether the function has a memory buffer overflow vulnerability. In the simple patch fragment shown in Figure 2 , there is a security point called strcpy in the function foo. Its security constraint is szBuf.uBuflen > szMsg.uBuflen, and its arguments are two char pointers. We allocate two pointer_info variables to record szBuf and szMsg pointer information. By using pointer relationship analysis and data flow analysis, if the length of szMsg is greater than 30 bytes, the security constraint is not satisfiable, and a memory buffer overflow occurs.
The memory out-of-bounds access checker is like the memory buffer overflow checker. However, the object to be checked is a pointer. Although C/C++ pointers have welldefined semantics, many programs still have code statements that may cause an out-of-bounds memory access vulnerability. We introduce a rule-based checker to detect out-of-bounds memory access vulnerabilities. In the checker, an array is treated as a pointer and the pointer relationship between a memory object and the pointer was already recorded during the path execution period by the symbolic execution engine. The checker captures all code statements where data is stored, shared, or accessed in memory through pointers. Then, it gets the length of the space that the pointer points to and the index that is used to access the object. If the index is out of the range of the object space, an out-of-bounds memory access vulnerability is detected.
2) MEMORY LEAK AND USE-AFTER-FREE CHECKERS
A memory leak is the most difficult type of memory vulnerability to detect, since they may not cause any problems until the system runs out of memory, which triggers the system's out of memory killer (OOM) mechanism. A remote attacker could use this leak for a denial-of-service attack. A memory leak may happen when a memory buffer is allocated and is not subsequently freed when it is supposed to be.
During the symbolic execution of a code path, the checker generates the set of heap objects that are allocated. The relationship analysis algorithm between pointers and heap objects works like the pointer analysis in SecTAC. When a heap object is freed by a call to a free memory function, such as free in the C language and delete in the C++ language, the checker removes the related pointers from the set. A function's return value, a program's static objects, and global heap objects cannot cause a memory leak, so the checker removes them from the set too. At the end of the path, the checker detects the heap objects that are not freed and are not reachable.
Based on the memory leak checker, we added two rules to make the checker detect use-after-free vulnerabilities and dangling pointer vulnerabilities. In the C/C++ language, deleting an object from memory explicitly does not alter any associated pointers, which still point to the same location in memory but become dangling. If a function still uses the pointer and does not associate another memory object with it, there is a use-after-free vulnerability.
Our rule for checking for use-after-free vulnerabilities is as follows. The checker intercepts all memory object operations and determines whether the associated pointer's bHasfreed value is true or false. If the object has been freed, the checker reports the vulnerability. Then, at the end of the path execution, the checker checks all memory objects that have been freed and determines whether their associated pointers have been set to NULL. If a pointer value is not NULL, it is a dangling pointer according to the dangling pointer definition.
3) UNINITIALIZED DATA ACCESS CHECKER
An uninitialized data access occurs when program code accesses a buffer before initializing it. Accessing uninitialized data from a stack or heap object may cause undefined or non-deterministic behavior, which is particularly difficult to debug. We introduce a checker that focuses on checking uninitialized data accesses of the stack and heap buffer to reduce the runtime cost. When a stack or heap buffer is allocated, the checker fills the buffer with special tainted data and sets the pointer bHasinit to false. During the path execution time, the checker captures all operations related to the pointer to check whether there is any uninitialized data. If yes, its bHasinit member value is false, and an uninitialized data access vulnerability is detected.
We also need to consider initialization operations, such as memcpy and memset. If a pointer is the destination argument in those functions, we set the value of bHasinit to true. When the checker encounters a third-party library function, KPSec skips the function call and sets the corresponding pointer's bHasinit value to true, because the third-party library function may assign the pointer.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION A. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
To test the effectiveness of KPSec, we evaluated it on hundreds of patches collected from GNU binutils, GNU coreutils, and OpenSSL. These are widely used and large enough to determine the effectiveness of KPSec.
GNU binutils contains around 100,000 lines of C code (LOC). GNU coreutils includes a variety of programs, such as ls and cut, and it has almost 200,000 LOC. OpenSSL is a widely used security-critical system that contains about 400,000 LOC. We include all patches from recent stable branches of the GIT repositories.
However, there are many patches that do not need to be checked, e.g., a patch that only changes the user documentation, changes copyright information, or updates a configuration file to handle a build error.
Therefore, we chose 209 patches from GNU binutils between version 2.22 and 2.24, 268 patches from GNU coreutils between version 8.17 and 8.24, and 284 patches from OpenSSL between version 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b.
We use five physical hosts of Inspur NF5240M3 servers to build the experimental environment. Each one has an Intel Xeon E5-2420 CPU and 32 GB of RAM and runs a 64-bit CentOS 6.3 system.
B. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
We first test the performance of KPSec. In general, the program analysis time is in proportion to the number of paths that need to be executed. Since the total number of paths is basically equal to 2 if-statements , we introduce a variable λ that represents the percentage of branches that are related to the security point over the total number of branches. We use the variable λ to classify patches, then run both KATCH [17] and KPSec on each path to measure the execution time. In our experiments, we focus on the tools' performance on executing paths and finding vulnerabilities. We also set a timeout of 30 minutes for each patch to ignore paths with an infinite execution time. Figure 3 shows the result. The average size of the patches is very small and the value of λ is between 0.01 and 0.13. The result shows that KPSec can achieve less than half of the execution time of KATCH when λ is less than 0.07. The average overall execution time of KPSec is 11.1 minutes, while that of KATCH is 22.3 minutes. The execution time of KPSec significantly increases with an increase of λ; however, there is no obvious connection between KATCH's execution time and λ.
Because KPSec generates patch-related paths through the security points, the total number of execution paths is very much dependent on λ. KATCH is designed to achieve high coverage by using existing test cases, therefore it needs to execute more paths, some of which may not contain vulnerabilities.
We next investigated the false negative and false positive rates of KPSec. From the patches we collected, there are a total of sixteen known vulnerabilities, including buffer overflows, memory leaks, uninitialized data accesses, and use-after-free vulnerabilities. For comparison, we run both KATCH and KPSec on each patch to evaluate the false negative and false positive rates. Table 1 shows the result. #KV is the number of vulnerabilities we tested, #FV is the number of vulnerabilities found by KPSec and KATCH, and #FN is the number of false negatives.
KPSec has a low false negative rate, compared to KATCH, especially when detecting memory leak vulnerabilities. Among the patches we tested, four are memory leak vulnerabilities, which KATCH cannot identify. Because KATCH is based on KLEE, it cannot detect more types of vulnerability than KLEE.
The result shows that KPSec missed one vulnerability. This vulnerability is not caused by the improper use of a security-sensitive function, so detecting it is beyond the detection scope of KPSec.
V. RELATED WORK
Software security has attracted considerable attention from industry and academia. There are many existing works on whole-program vulnerability detection based on symbolic execution. KLEE [15] and SecTAC [16] are two famous symbolic execution engines. Those engines discover as many execution paths as possible, then perform symbolic execution on each path. KLEE uses a combination of concrete and symbolic execution to search program paths, while SecTAC reuses existing test cases to produce traces of the exercised program paths. Although whole-program analysis suffers from the path explosion problem, symbolic execution could be useful for checking patches. Our approach also uses symbolic execution to check patches, but we focus on detecting the pieces of code that are affected by patches, and apply the pruning method to mitigate the well-known path explosion problem.
Yang et al. present DiSE [14] , a novel technique for detecting and characterizing the impact of program changes to scale symbolic execution. DiSE performs whole-program symbolic execution, but prunes paths unaffected by a patch. Regression verification [5] uses abstraction to achieve scalability, but may report false differences. Hydrogen [18] , a framework presented by Le et al., consists of a graph representation of multiple versions of a program called a multiversion inter-procedural control flow graph (MVICFG), and a demand-driven path-sensitive symbolic analysis that traverses the MVICFG to detect bugs related to software changes and versions. In contrast, our approach focuses on detecting the parts of a program affected by a patch, by exploring all possible execution paths and doing full-path symbolic execution to reduce the false negative and false positive rates. KATCH [17] , presented by Det al., combines symbolic execution with several novel heuristics based on static and dynamic program analysis to generate regression tests to expose the changes caused by a patch. KATCH uses existing test cases as a starting point for synthesizing new inputs, then employs three heuristics (greedy exploration, informed path regeneration, and definition switching) to study the patch. KATCH has high coverage, but only explores a small set of execution paths. Unlike KATCH, our method does not need to generate any test cases.
UC-KLEE [19] is a novel scalable framework that uses a variant of under-constrained symbolic execution to check C/C++ code. UC-KLEE can be used to check whether patches introduce crashes. UC-KLEE begins with a top-level function that is chosen by the user, and all the functions called by this top-level function will be included. After all execution paths have been exhausted, it can verify whether a function has introduced any crashes. Directly invoking a function will miss some preconditions, which may cause false positives. Therefore, UC-KLEE provides both automated heuristics and an interface for users to silence these errors manually. Unlike UC-KLEE, our approach starts with a security point, constructs execution paths through the security point, then performs symbolic execution for each path by considering all path conditions and security conditions to check for several types of vulnerabilities.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present KPSec, a tool for checking whether a patch introduces new vulnerabilities. We at first use static analysis to get the part of the program that is affected by the patch. Then, beginning with functions and variables that may cause a memory vulnerability, we use the pruning method to mitigate the path exploration problem, and get its major execution paths. Afterwards, we combine symbolic execution and checkers to detect all paths to find vulnerabilities. We evaluate KPSec on real-world software patches from GNU binutils, GNU coreutils, and OpenSSL. The result shows that KPSec can quickly detect security vulnerabilities introduced by patches. For the sixteen known vulnerabilities introduced by patches, KPSec detects fifteen of them. In conclusion, KPSec is effective and efficient in checking the vulnerability of software patches.
However, there are some limitations in the proposed approach, which need to be considered in future work. First, we cannot deal with third-party library function calls because the approach works only on source code. Therefore, for those function calls, we could not get their relationship with the patch and evaluate them during the detection. Second, our current work focuses on typical memory-related vulnerabilities, since those vulnerabilities are hard to detect and they may break the stability and security of a software system. Nevertheless, a patch will introduce other types of vulnerability that we need to pay attention to, such as data racing. It is necessary to extend our security checkers to detect those types of vulnerabilities. He is currently a Professor of Computer Science with HUST. He has applied 20 patents, authored two books, and over 50 research papers. His main research interests include system security, trusted computing, virtualization, and cloud security. He has served as a Reviewer of several prestigious journals, such as the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS, the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTERS, the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, and the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CLOUD COMPUTING. He is on the editorial boards of four international journals, and has served as the PC chair and a PC member of over 40 international conferences. 
